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1. Introduction  
 
The Accord for Fire and Building Safety in 
Bangladesh (otherwise known as the “Bangladesh 
Fire and Safety Accord”, the “Bangladesh Accord” or 
the “Accord”) was formally signed by more than 40 
apparel companies, two global unions and four 
Bangladeshi union federations – with four labour 
rights NGOs signing as witnesses – on May 23, 2013. 
As of July 4, 2013, a total of 67 companies have 
signed the Accord. 
 
The Accord sets out the framework for a 
comprehensive program of independent and 
transparent inspections, health and safety training 
and worker empowerment, time-bound and 
financially-supported remediation of health and 
safety risks, and real repercussions for suppliers that 
refuse to comply. The Accord has been endorsed by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
International Labour Organization, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, amongst others.  
 
The Accord represents the culmination of years of 
work by trade union and labour rights 
organizations to develop and gain agreement on 
enforceable and effective safety standards for the 
Bangladesh ready-made garment industry. It is the 
result of widespread consultations and discussions 
with various stakeholders both within Bangladesh 
and internationally, involving buyers, suppliers, 
worker representatives and governments.  
 
This brief account of the story behind the 
Bangladesh Fire and Safety Accord was prepared by 
the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) and the 
Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), two of the 
labour rights NGOs that were closely involved in the 
process of creating a strong and binding 
agreement on fire and building safety in 
Bangladesh. The purpose of this paper is to clarify 
the precedent-setting nature of the agreement, its 
key provisions and their antecedents, and to 
explain how participants in the process from all 
sides – both in Bangladesh and internationally – 
contributed to the substance and successful 






2. History  
 
The Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
is a response by international and Bangladeshi 
trade union and labour rights organizations to 
bitter experience with a series of factory fires and 
two building collapses in Bangladesh and the 
failure of voluntary efforts by international brands 
and retailers to prevent further disasters.  
 
It first began to take form in February 2010 in the 
wake of a fire at the Garib & Garib Sweater Factory 
in Dhaka, which killed 21 workers. The International 
Textile, Garment and Leatherworkers Federation 
(ITGLWF – now a part of IndustriALL) worked with 
Bangladeshi unions on a set of proposals to 
improve fire and building safety. These were 
codified into a set of Health and Safety Action Points 
for Buyers by the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), the 
International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), the 
Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) and the Worker 




April 2010, on the fifth anniversary of the collapse 
of the Spectrum Factory.   
 
The Health and Safety Action Points included many 
of the provisions now addressed by the Bangladesh 
Accord, including a thorough review of all multi-
story garment production facilities, expert fire and 
building safety inspections, public disclosure of 
audit reports and a list of factories that do not meet 
standards, income support for workers displaced 
during renovations, and provisions for workers to 
report and challenge health and safety violations 
with fear of retaliation. 
 
Following the publication of the Action Points, the 
ITGLWF and Bangladeshi unions convened a 
meeting in Dhaka with major buyers including Gap, 
TEMA, Nike, Walmart, H&M, Levis, Tesco, Primark 
and Inditex to discuss brand approaches to health 
and safety in Bangladeshi factories.  
 
A follow-up meeting took place in December 2010, 
and was attended by representatives of buyers, the 
garment industry, trade unions and labour rights 
groups. The Bangladeshi government failed to send 
a representative to the meeting. The meeting 
focused on sharing progress on individual 
programmes being carried out by buyers, the 
BGMEA and trade unions, which were largely 
limited to an increased focus on electrical 
inspections. The meeting resulted in few, if any, 
concrete proposals for action.  
 
Less than two weeks later, a major fire engulfed the 
“That’s It Sportswear” factory, killing 29 more 
workers. The factory was producing for JC Penney, 
VF Corporation, Gap, Phillips-Van Heusen (now 
known as PVH Corp), Abercrombie & Fitch, Carters, 
Kohls and Target.    
 
The disaster – followed closely by more deaths at 
other factories – prompted another meeting 
between Bangladeshi and international unions and 
NGOs, international brands and retailers, and the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA) in Dhaka, April 2011. The 
government was represented by officials from the 
Fire Safety Department and the Building and 
Factories Department. Participants discussed the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
that would establish a program of work aimed to 
prevent future tragedies. The program would be 
overseen by a multi-stakeholder task force. 
Negotiations on a MoU were expected to continue 
until the summer of 2011, with the hope that a final 
MoU could be signed within months. 
 
Although a draft MoU was presented at that 
meeting and a committee struck that was tasked 
with its further development, the BGMEA, BKMEA 
and brand representatives failed to follow up on 
this commitment to participate in the redrafting of 
the MoU.. However, the ITGLWF, CCC, ILRF, MSN 
and WRC continued to discuss a possible MoU 
separately with two companies – Gap and PVH – 
and then later with Tchibo.  
 
Discussions with Gap Inc. proceeded over the 
remainder of 2011, and the company contributed 
to what eventually became the final text of the 
MoU. However the company eventually proved 
unwilling to sign the proposed MoU. Instead, Gap 
announced in October 2012 that it would go it 
alone with the same self-regulatory approach that it 
and other brands have used for two decades, but 
which has failed to protect the safety of workers in 
Bangladesh: company-controlled factory 
monitoring with no transparency, no role for 
workers or their trade unions, no commitment to 
pay prices to suppliers that make it feasible for 
them operate responsibly, and no binding 
commitments of any kind. 
 
Discussions with PVH Corp. (owners of Tommy 
Hilfiger and Calvin Klein brands, amongst others), 
began in late 2011 parallel to the discussions with 
Gap. Unlike Gap, however, PVH Corp. signed a MoU 
with Bangladeshi and international labour rights 
groups and trade unions, including the ITGLWF, 
CCC, ILRF, WRC and MSN on March 15, 2012. The 
MoU contained most of the provisions now found 
in the Bangladesh Accord, including independent 
building inspections, worker rights training, public 
disclosure and a long-overdue review of safety 
standards.  
 
On September 14, 2012, the German retailer Tchibo 
signed a similar MoU with the labour same 
organizations. By that time, the provisions of the 
MoU had been elaborated and governance 
structures improved, although the program itself as 
defined in the original MOU had not changed 
substantially. In the interim the ITGLWF had 
merged with the International Federation of 
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' 
Unions (ICEM) and the International Metalworkers 
Federation (IMF) and formed the global union 
IndustriALL, which then became a key signatory to 
the new MoU with Tchibo.  
 
PVH Corp eventually agreed to the same terms as 
Tchibo, but the MoU still required at least four 
major buyers to sign before its provisions would be 




Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety Agreement 
(BFBSA), and between September 2012 and April 
2013, the BFBSA signatories urged other global 
companies to also sign the agreement in order to 
help prevent further tragedies from occurring. 
None were willing to do so. 
 
On November 24, 2012, a catastrophic fire at the 
nine-story Tazreen Fashion garment factory in 
Dhaka took the lives of over 112 workers. What was 
reportedly an electrical malfunction appears to 
have been compounded by the factory’s lack of 
basic safety measures like unobstructed exits, 
external emergency exits, functioning fire 
extinguishers, and worker training.  
 
Rather than recognizing the Tazreen disaster as a 
wake-up call to coalesce around the BFBSA’s clear 
program of work on fire and building safety, in 
December 2012 a separate and vague proposal was 
floated by Wal-Mart, Tesco, Carrefour and Migros 
under the auspices of the Global Social Compliance 
Program (GSCP), an industry-led organization. The 
proposal called for a collective approach to fire and 
building safety and the development of a program 
that would include some of the same components 
as those of the BFBSA, including (according to the 
proposal): 
 
• Better regulation and stronger 
enforcement 
• Investment in safer facilities and 
infrastructure 
• Closure of unsafe premises 
• Engagement of workers and their 
representatives in promoting safe working 
practices with management and reporting 
of issues to competent authorities 
• Effective training and emergency 
preparedness of all staff 
• Assessment of buyers’ responsibilities and 
necessary improvement of practices 
 
The companies involved in this new initiative 
looked to the German development agency GIZ 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit) to coordinate the program.  
 
At the national level in Bangladesh, the BGMEA, 
trade unions and the Government of Bangladesh 
agreed to develop a tripartite National Action Plan 
on January 15th, 2013. The NAP, as it became 
known, set out a plan of work including a review of 
national safety standards, improvements to 
inspection capacities, fire safety training for 
managers and workers, and establishment of a fire 
safety hotline, amongst other things. The NAP was 
welcomed by IndustriALL and others as a means 
toward strengthening national-level actions on fire 
safety. However it did not specifically address the 
means by which international buyers could support 
the process of ensuring fire and building safety in 
their supplier factories.    
 
Over the months that followed, the GIZ convened 
conference calls and meetings with numerous 
global companies and solicited interest in the 
possibility of developing a parallel program to the 
PVH/Tchibo MoU.  
 
Outlines of what the GIZ program might entail, and 
who would be involved, suggested there might be 
some similarities to the provisions in the BFBSA. 
However there was a lack of clarity concerning a 
number of elements, and some fundamental 
provisions were not addressed at all in the 
GSCP/GIZ proposal, including, but not limited to: 
 
• The transparency of factory lists, 
remediation efforts and inspection reports 
– both to the public and to workers and 
their organizations – was not assured;  
• The consequences of failure to comply 
with remediation plans was not spelled 
out, nor were the supports to be made 
available to workers who may be displaced 
either by significant renovations or by any 
loss of orders resulting from a supplier’s 
failure to remediate high-risk violations; 
• Buyers were not required to commit to 
either prices or continued orders at 
comparable volumes to incentivize 
suppliers; 
• There was no binding dispute resolution 
process. 
 
IndustriALL expressed a willingness to meet with 
GIZ to find a way to merge the two processes and 
seek common ground on a program of work for 
Bangladesh. Together with the CCC, WRC, ILRF and 
MSN, they outlined the key principles of a program 
that would be acceptable to trade union and NGO 
representatives and agreed to discuss the 
possibility of developing a single, unified proposal 
that would address those key principles at a 
meeting of brands, IndustriALL and some labour 
rights NGOs on April 29, 2013 in Geneva. 
 
On April 24, the Rana Plaza factory building 
collapsed, killing over 1,100 workers and injuring 




to develop a unitary and comprehensive fire and 
building safety program was clear to all. 
 
The April 29, 2013 GIZ-sponsored meeting brought 
together representatives from IndustriALL, GIZ,  
many major European and North American apparel 
brands and retailers, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), 
CCC, WRC, and others.  
 
The participants reviewed two program proposals – 
the key principles of the BFBSA and the GIZ 
proposal – and established a committee to draft a 
new, joint agreement by May 5th, which would be 
circulated for final approval by May 15, 2013.  
 
Although the drafting committee began its work 
shortly after the meeting, it quickly became clear 
that agreement on the key principles put forward 
by IndustriALL et al was not going to be possible. 
On May 5th, IndustriALL and the global union UNI, 
jointly with NGO partners issued a new version of 
the BFBSA – now called the Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in Bangladesh – and asked major 
brands and retailers to endorse the Accord by May 
15th. The key provisions of the Accord were closely 
based on those in the earlier BFBSA, but some of 
the language and structure was modified to take 
into account concerns and suggestions for 
improvement expressed by companies with whom 
the Global Unions had consulted. It also explicitly 
endorsed the NAP (which had not existed when the 
earlier BFBSA was signed) and pledged to dovetail 
its efforts with the actions being undertaken under 
the NAP.  
 
A comparison of the components of the BFBSA and 
the final Bangladesh Accord is set out in the 
following section.  
 
On the morning of May 13th, H&M (the largest buyer 
of apparel from Bangladesh) announced that it 
would sign the Accord with IndustriALL and UNI. In 
the hours and days that followed, almost forty 
companies announced their intention to sign the 
Accord. It was formally signed between the 
international brand buyers, the global unions and 
Bangladeshi unions on May 23, 2013, with the 




3.  Key components of the Accord 
 
The Bangladesh Accord has 25 clauses setting out 
its core components. The main principles and 
components of the Accord are consistent with 
those of the earlier BFBSA with PVH Corp and 
Tchibo.  These principles and components are 
based on discussions among and proposals from 
unions, NGOs, suppliers in Bangladesh and 
international brands and retailers. They are 
informed by over a decade of experience by unions 
and labour rights NGOs in documenting and 
responding to a series of preventable factory 
disasters, as well as the experiences and limitations 
of the factory monitoring and safety programs of 
the Bangladeshi government, local suppliers and 
international buyers.  
 
The most important components of both the BFBSA 
and the Accord, as well as the differences in the 
provisions in the two agreements, are as follows: 
 
Independent inspector:  
Over more than a decade, numerous factories in 
Bangladesh that later proved to be deathtraps were 
deemed by company auditors or commercial 
auditing firms to be sufficiently compliant with 
company codes and national law for the 
international buyer to continue sourcing from the 
facilities without requiring upgrading.  
 
Recognizing the weaknesses of current company-
controlled monitoring programs, as well as the 
failure of the Bangladeshi government to enforce 
its own laws, the Accord, as well as the earlier 
BFBSA, provide for an independent inspector with 
the authority to report publicly on the results of 
his/her findings and to issue remediation orders. 
This is to ensure the quality of factory inspections, 
to provide stakeholders information on the results 
of those inspections, and to ensure that 
remediation takes place without interference.  
 
Differences between the Accord and BFBSA: In the 
BFBSA, the inspector was to be chosen from a 
list provided by the Coordinator of the 
Maquiladora Health and Safety Support 
Network (MHSSN), a credible independent OSH 
expert. In the Accord, a three-person 
committee selects the independent inspector. 
(The MHSSN Coordinator has since been 






Tiered factory structure:  
Under both Accord and the BFBSA, supplier 
factories are grouped in tiers based on the volume 
of production placed in those factories by 
participating buyers. This structure was suggested 
by company signatories to recognize that 
additional measures are more likely to be 
implemented where buyer influence is stronger. 
Factories with a higher volume of production are 
subjected to the full program of inspections and 
training, while factories in the lowest of the three 
tiers receive a full inspection but no training. If a 
lowest tier factory is found to have serious health 
and safety issues, however, it will be placed in a 
higher tier and subjected to additional measures.  
 
Transparency:  
Some brand buyers had claimed that prior to the 
fire at the Garib & Garib factory in 2010 they had 
identified safety risks and therefore had 
discontinued orders to the factory. However they 
failed to publicize or share these findings with other 
buyers or governmental authorities. As a result, the 
factory was allowed to continue operating without 
addressing these serious risks, with fatal 
consequences.  
 
Under the Accord, as was the case under the BFBSA, 
the results of factory inspections and any 
remediation plans and efforts will be made public, 
adding incentive for factories to improve safety 
conditions in a timely manner and ensuring that 
serious risks are not left unaddressed. In addition, a 
full list of factories subjected to the program will be 
made publicly available, although in neither the 
BFBSA nor the Accord would the names of factories 
be linked to individual buyers.  
 
Training program with union involvement:  
Worker empowerment is a critical element of 
worker safety training – without the power and 
confidence to voice complaints, knowledge of 
potential risks is of little use. Further, in order to 
establish sustainable compliance in the 
Bangladeshi industry, trade unions must be seen by 
suppliers as partners in health and safety matters, 
not as enemies. 
 
Under the Accord, health and safety training for 
workers and management personnel will be 
coordinated by a Training Coordinator appointed 
by the Steering Committee, and Bangladeshi trade 
unions will have the right to participate in worker 
training efforts.  
 
The provisions for health and safety training in the 
Accord are consistent with those in the BFBSA. 
Right to refuse unsafe work:  
When Tchibo signed the initial MoU, a clause was 
added (at the request of labour rights signatories) 
that guaranteed the right of workers to refuse 
unsafe work without fear of retaliation. If this right 
had been recognized at Rana Plaza, workers would 
have been able to refuse to go back into the unsafe 
building after it was initially closed, preventing 
more than 1,100 deaths and thousands of injuries.  
 
This is now a central element in the Accord. 
 
Worker health and safety committees:  
An active health and safety committee in the 
workplace can identify and act on health and safety 
risks on a day-to-day basis, in a way that occasional 
buyer or third-party auditing cannot. Such 
committees are required by Bangladeshi law, but 
seldom exist in practice. 
 
Under both the BFBSA and the Accord, factories are 
required to establish joint worker-management 
health and safety committees which will operate in 
compliance with Bangladeshi law.  
 
Buyer support for remediation:  
The BFBSA and the Accord both forbid buyers from 
establishing prices “such that the factories would 
be without the financial wherewithal to maintain 
safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and 
remediation requirements instituted by the Chief 
Inspector”.  
 
Differences in Accord and BFBSA: The Accord 
provides further guidance, stating, “Each 
signatory company may, at its option, use 
alternative means to ensure factories have the 
financial capacity to comply with remediation 
requirements, including but not limited to joint 
investments, providing loans, accessing donor 
or government support, through offering 
business incentives or through paying for 
renovations directly.” These options were 
requested by early signatory companies to 
recognize other possible means of funding 
improvements to factories. For labour rights 
stakeholders, the precise method of paying for 
remediation is not important, but it is 
important that commercial terms do not 
undermine efforts to provide safe workplaces 
and decent working conditions. 
  
Commitment to continued sourcing:  
As a further incentive to suppliers in Bangladesh, 
the company signatories to the Accord have agreed 
to maintain order volumes with Tier 1 and 2 




program provided it is commercially viable and the 
factory continues to meet its obligations under the 
Accord.  
 
Differences in Accord and BFBSA: Under the 
BFBSA, if a factory was cut off for non-
compliance under the agreement, those orders 
were also to be shifted to another factory in 
Bangladesh, if possible. This requirement was 
removed in the Accord at the request of early 
company signatories, under the condition that 
they agreed to a five-year program of work 
rather than a two-year program.  
 
Support for workers displaced by remediation:  
Similarly, where workers are displaced as a result of 
renovation efforts, the signatory companies will 
require suppliers to maintain their employment and 
incomes during the renovations. At the request of 
early company signatories, the Accord clarifies that 
this shall be done for up to six months. If a non-
compliant factory closes, the signatory companies 
are to make reasonable efforts to find workers 
employment at other, compliant factories, and to 
establish preferential hiring for those workers. This 
provision ensures that workers are not made to 
suffer for the failures of the employer. 
 
Governance structure:  
In both the BFBSA and the Accord, the safety 
program is to be overseen by a committee, called 
the Steering Committee under the Accord, made 
up of equal representation from labour and 
company signatories, with a neutral Chair. The fact 
that trade union partners have an equal say in 
governance of the factory inspection program is a 
critical difference between the Accord and 
company-controlled monitoring programs. Under 
the Accord, there is also an Advisory Board that 
includes other brands and retailers, suppliers, 
unions, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, to ensure that a wide range of 
stakeholders’ views are represented in the 
implementation of the program.  
 
Differences in Accord and BFBSA: The BFBSA 
included NGOs as signatories, and as part of 
the governance structure. By mutual 
agreement, the Accord was signed between 
trade unions and companies, with NGOs 
signing as witnesses. In line with that decision, 
and the Steering Committee consists of an 
equal number of union and company 
representatives, the neutral Chair is chosen by 
the ILO, and the members of the Advisory 
Board are appointed by the signatories to the 
Accord.  
Dispute resolution:  
Signatories to both the BFBSA and the Accord 
agreed to establish a binding and legally-
enforceable dispute resolution process, based on 
standard international commercial arbitration 
models. Under the Accord, the process was further 
clarified. Disputes are first referred to the Steering 
Committee for resolution, and only referred to 
binding arbitration (using the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law – 
UNCITRAL – Model Rules) if agreement is not 
reached at the Steering Committee. Arbitral awards 
(under the New York Convention) can be enforced 
by a court in any applicable jurisdiction. Although 
the Accord spelled out the process in more detail, 
legally-binding arbitration was an essential element 
of each agreement. For labour signatories, a 
binding agreement is necessary after eight years of 
voluntary programs failed to make any progress in 
eliminating life-threatening safety violations in 
Bangladeshi factories.  
 
Additional differences in the Accord: 
 
• Coordination with the National Action 
Plan (NAP): Because the NAP had been 
developed in January, 2013, after the signing of 
the BFBSA, the signatories to the Accord all 
agreed that efforts should be made to 
coordinate with the parties involved in the 
NAP. For example, a worker complaint system 
is to be established under the Accord (and also 
under the BFBSA), but this is now to be aligned 
with a worker complaint hotline that is being 
created under the NAP. 
   
• Five year timeline: The final Accord 
extended the fire and building safety program 
to five years (from the original two). This was 
requested by the companies that attended the 
April 29th GIZ meeting, and agreed to by all 
signatories to the Accord. 
 
• Recognition of company inspection 
programmes: In order to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of efforts, the Accord allows the 
Safety Inspector to recognize and incorporate 
company inspection programs if they meet or 
exceed the program’s standards. However, 
every factory supplying one or more 
signatories to the Accord will be subject to at 








Following the signing of the Accord, negotiations 
began between signatories on a full 
Implementation Plan. Those negotiations will 
define in greater detail its administrative structures, 
staffing, data collection, financial commitments and 
other procedures necessary to put the Accord’s 
comprehensive program into practice.  
 
Now that a comprehensive, enforceable and 
widely-supported agreement is in place, it is critical 
that:  
a) all buyers sourcing garments in 
Bangladesh sign on to the Accord and 
deliver a consistent message to their 
suppliers; and  
b) the parties to the Accord deliver on the 
promise made to Bangladeshi workers in 
the Accord – that they will no longer be 
forced to risk their lives every time they 
enter their place of work.   
 
Lastly, while the Bangladesh Accord’s program 
applies only to Bangladesh, there is an urgent need 
for buyers, suppliers, trade unions and NGOs 
working in other countries like Pakistan, Cambodia, 
and India (all of which have experienced their own 
fatal factory disasters) to learn from this experience 
and develop effective, comprehensive and binding 
agreements in their own countries in order to 
improve workplace safety and other conditions for 
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